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ON THE HUMAN BODY AS
PROPERTY: THE MEANING OF
EMBODIMENT, MARKETS, AND
THE MEANING OF STRANGERS
Thomas H. Murray*

Darius, after he had got the kingdom, called into his presence certain Greeks who were at hand, and asked what he
should pay them to eat the bodies of their fathers when they
died. To which they answered, that there was no sum that
would tempt them to do such a thing. He then sent for certain
Indians, of the race called Callatians, men who eat their fathers, and asked them, while the Greeks stood by ... what he
should give them to burn the bodies of their fathers at their
decease. The Indians exclaimed aloud, and bade him forbear
such language. 1
Herodotus took this as proof of Pindar's judgment that "[l]aw
[or custom, or mores] is the king o'er all." 2 But we will take it as
proof that for all their differences about what constituted respectful treatment of the dead bodies of their fathers, the
Greeks and the Callatians were equally horrified at the prospect
of treating them disrespectfully. Darius ruled, however, over the
Persians as well. They were so disdainful of the body that they
would not bury one of their dead until the corpse had been torn
by a dog or a bird of prey. In our dealings with the body, we
must decide whether we have more in common with the Greeks
and Callatians, or with Darius's Persians.
For as long as I can recall, newspapers have published brief
items in which someone has calculated what the human body is
"worth" on the open market. The value of the body-as reduced
to its chemical components-was never more than a few dollars.
A more accurate accounting, though, would include the market
value of transplantable organs and tissues, as well as the potential bonanza to be had should a cell line cultured from that body
• Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine and Director,
Center for Biomedical Ethics. B.A., 1968, Temple University; Ph.D., 1976, Princeton
University.
1. HERODOTUS, HISTORY OF THE GREEK AND PERSIAN WAR 137 (W. Forrest ed. 1963);
see also L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 281 (1985).
2. HERODOTUS, supra note 1, at 138.
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prove valuable to the biotechnology industry. The bottom line
could be anywhere from tens of thousands to perhaps millions of
dollars.
Unfortunately, this more "realistic" accounting of the body's
worth destroys the humor latent in those earlier efforts. What
made us chuckle at those stories was the obvious ludicrousness
of imposing one concept of "value" (monetary price as determined by markets) upon an object (the human body) for which
it is wholly inappropriate. We knew that the worth of our bodies
was not remotely gauged by such calculations. We may not have
been certain why. Now that body parts may become a lucrative
economic asset (for many of us, our single most valuable asset),
we can no longer afford to leave unexamined the source of our
body's worth. Scholars are proposing that we ought to be allowed to sell off pieces of our bodies,3 and entrepreneurs are
looking for legal openings permitting them to create markets in
human body parts! Before subscribing to such schemes, we need
to examine what is at stake.
Both moral and legal questions arise. Would it be a good practice for people to be buying and selling their body parts? What
attitude should the law take towards potential markets in
human body parts? This Article will focus on the moral question, although both common and statutory law governing the
treatment of the body are in part manifestations of prevailing
moral views about the body, and will be discussed as such.
Proponents of markets in human body parts argue, like Darius, that the moral outrage towards what we regard as misuse of
the human body is mere superstition and sentimentality. 11 Looking closely at the arguments, they find no good reason to interfere with the liberty of individuals to buy and sell body parts. 6
The promarket supporters are correct in asserting that society
should not infringe on liberty without good reason, but they err
in dismissing the broad and strong moral sentiment against such
markets as having no reasonable grounds. There are at least
three broad reasons for opposing markets in human body parts.
The first rests on the moral significance of the human body-the
meaning of embodiment. 7 The second comes from an analysis of
3. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1986, at 28-38.
4. See, e.g., Annas, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Organ Sales, HASTINGS CENTER
REP .. Feb. 1984, at 22-23.
5. See Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.
1985, at 31-37.
6. See H. ENGELHARDT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 127-35 (1986).
7. See infra notes 20-83 and accompanying text.
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the pros and cons of plausible markets in body parts, and the
effects of such markets on the common good and on justice. 8
The third reason focuses upon the uses of certain human body
parts to assuage human needs, and the role of gifts, including
impersonal gifts, in promoting solidarity within a large, bureaucratic society. 9
I.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE COMMERCIALIZATION
OF THE HUMAN BODY

Social controversies never appear in a vacuum. To set the
stage for a discussion of these theoretical issues, we must describe the practical context in which questions about the commercializability of the body have arisen.
Although debates over the appropriateness of markets in
human materials, particularly blood, date back almost two decades, two relatively recent phenomena have sharpened the controversy: the prospect of markets in human organs, and the discovery that human biomaterials may have considerable market
value to the biotechnology industry.
A.

Markets in Human Organs

The increasing success rate for organ transplantation, coupled
with the inadequacy of prevailing methods for obtaining transplantable organs, resulted in a shortage of organs and prompted
the emergence of a market in human organs. Advertisements appeared in American publications offering organs for sale, and
one Virginia entrepreneur went so far as to obtain a license for
the import and export of human organs. 1 ° Kidneys are of special
interest because they are transplanted with the most success of
all major organs, and because humans are born with two but
need only one healthy one to live. 11
8. See infra notes 84-109 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
10. Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, Wash.
Post, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9, col. 1.
11. One would-be vendor offered to sell his liver, until it was pointed out to him that,
alas, he had no.spare. This story was related to the author by Arthur L. Caplan, Director
of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota. Dr. Caplan received
a phone call from this individual.
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In 1968, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
a model Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which, as the title implies, addresses gifts of the body or its parts for transplantation,
medical research, and education. 12 The Act, adopted mostly intact by all states and the District of Columbia, is mute on the
subject of commerce in the body. Filling this gap, Congress enacted the National Organ Transplant Act in 1984. 13 The Act
prohibits the purchase for transplantation of human livers, kidneys, hearts, lungs, pancreases, bone marrow, corneas, eyes,
bone, or skin. A number of states have passed laws with similar
provisions banning the commercialization of transplantable
human organs and tissues in intrastate commerce as well. 14 Although the new laws may have settled for now the legality of
such sales, the debate over the ethics of markets in transplantable organs remains lively.

B.

The Biotechnology Lottery and the Mo Cell Line

One of the strangest fruits of biotechnology is the case of the
Mo Cell Line. Biologists, in recent years, have improved greatly
their ability to create and sustain so-called "immortal" cell lines
derived from human cells. These cell cultures earn the honorific
"immortal" because, unlike normal human cells that divide a finite number of times and then perish, these cells continue to
grow and divide indefinitely.
Occasionally, an immortal human cell line is developed that
has commercial value to the emerging biotechnology industry.
Such may have been the case in the Mo Cell Line, developed
from the cells of John Moore who suffered from a rare cancer of
the blood known as hairy cell leukemia. H As a side effect of the
disease, Moore's spleen became dangerously enlarged. To foreclose the possibility that his spleen would rupture and kill him,
Moore's physician at the time, Dr. David Golde, recommended
that Moore have his spleen removed; that was done. Dr. Golde
12. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, SA U.L.A. 15 (1985).
13. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e
(Supp. III 1985)).
14. E.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 367f (West Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 5-408 (1982 & Supp. 1987); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10204 (West Supp. 1987);
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW§ 4307 (McKinney 1985); VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-289.1 (1985).
15. See The Use of Human Biological Materials in the Development of Biomedical
Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight. of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 240-78 (1985) (statement of
John Moore, leukemia patient/research subject).
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arranged for material from Moore's spleen to be sent to his laboratory for research purposes. At this point Dr. Golde's and Mr.
Moore's accounts diverge.
According to Mr. Moore, he made approximately a dozen trips
from Seattle to Los Angeles to see Dr. Golde during which samples of his blood were taken. All these visits were at Mr. Moore's
expense until April 1983 when, after Mr. Moore suggested the
samples be taken locally, Dr. Golde offered to pay his expenses.
At this visit, Mr. Moore was presented with a new consent form
that read in part "I (do, do not) voluntarily grant to the University of California any and all rights I, or my heirs, may have in
any cell line or any other potential product which might be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained from
me." 16 Moore signed this form, circling "do." On his next (and
last) visit, Moore claims he was again given the same form to
sign; this time he circled "do not." This apparently led to some
consternation in Dr. Golde's lab, and despite calls and letters
requesting him to sign the form with "do" circled, Moore opted
instead to go in search of a lawyer.
The source of the consternation was the rights to an immortal
cell line that scientists in Dr. Golde's lab had cultured from Mr.
Moore's cells. Moreover, this cell line-dubbed the "Mo Cell
Line"-produced significant quantities of a group of biologically
important proteins called lymphokines that act as messengers to
tell cells to mature, divide, or do any of a number of things. 17
Normal human cells produce such small quantities of
lymphokines that they cannot be isolated in useful amounts.
Possibly because of a defect in their genetic control mechanisms,
the T-lymphocytes (a kind of white blood cell crucial in fighting
infection, the same kind destroyed by the AIDS virus) from
Moore's body produced prodigious quantities of a number of
lymphokines.
Moore's diseased cells, thanks to the ingenuity of Dr. Golde's
research team, had the potential to be a scientific bonanza. But
external events soon took the Mo Cell Line, its scientific midwives, -and its progenitor beyond the laboratory. By the late
1970's, biotechnology had begun to attract attention and money.
Researchers began to realize that biological research could have
great commercial value. In this heady atmosphere, Dr. Golde re16.
17.

Id. at 268.
See OFFICE

OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

U.S.

CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN

BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS

OTA].

31-46 (1987) [hereinafter
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ported to UCLA's patent office that he had a potentially valuable, patentable cell line. 18 On March 20, 1984, the United States
Patent Office granted patent number 4,438,032 for a "Unique TLymphocyte Line and Products Derived Therefrom." 19
By April 1984, Mr. Moore had found his lawyer, and the legal
battle began over the ownership of the cell line and the patents
derived from it. Is the cell line rightfully the property of Dr.
Golde and his institution, because it was his recognition of its
significance and the admixture of his skill and art that led to the
patent? Or, because it was a part of Mr. Moore's body, indeed a
living part, and because it may have been put to uses not contemplated by him when he consented to its use in research, does
he still retain some interest in it? Is Mr. Moore entitled to a
share in profits derived from the Mo Cell line? Although all
these questions are significant, the chief issue I will discuss is
whether and in what forms the human body, its parts, or its
products is a fit object for commercial trade.

II.

THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EMBODIMENT

Human individuals exist, so far as we know, only as embodied
beings. What to make of this cold fact, though, has posed an
intellectual challenge at least as old as our earliest written traditions. For some, the body is morally insignificant or worse-an
impediment to the attainment of higher goods. For others, our
bodies are as much a part of our core moral selves as our minds
(or souls). In this section, I will examine several answers to the
question: What is the moral significance of the body? I will look
at the answers given in Anglo-American common law, and by
classical and contemporary, secular and religious thinkers.

A.

Anglo-American Law and the Body: An Informal Moral
Archaeology

As a social creation, the law, at least in part, reflects the moral
convictions of its creators. When courts occasionally refer to offenses against public sensibilities, it is difficult to imagine what
else such references might mean if not that some action or prac18. Letter from David W. Golde, M.D. to Roger G. Ditzel (Aug. 17, 1979) (accompanying Report on Possibly Patentable Device, Process, Product, or Plant).
19. U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (Mar. 20, 1984) to Golde.
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tice contravenes deeply held beliefs about what is good or acceptable. 20 Any effort to interpret common law or statute as having normative, rather than merely descriptive, moral
connotations must proceed cautiously, however. For example, if
friendship between blacks and whites in the antebellum South
offended the sensibilities of genteel whites, that is hardly a convincing moral reason to condemn interracial friendships. But we
can learn something about our moral beliefs by looking at the
law's response to moral dilemmas. If the pattern revealed in our
laws is consistent with good reasons to hold specific moral beliefs, we can see ethics and law as mutually supportive. I believe
this is true of our ethics and law regarding the treatment of the
body.
Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery 21 provides an
opportunity to test my theory. The case involved a dispute between a wife and daughter over burial. The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted "[t]hat there is no right or property in a
dead body, using the word in its ordinary sense . . . . Yet the
burial of the dead is a subject which interests the feelings of
mankind to a much greater degree than many matters of actual
property."22 The court then determined the body to be quasi
property
to which certain persons may have rights, as they have
duties to perform towards it arising out of our common
humanity. But the person having charge of it cannot be
considered as the owner . . . he holds it only as a sacred
trust for the benefit of all who may from family or friendship have an interest in it. 23
There must be some analytic scheme under which people may
find redress, or be punished, when the body or its parts are stolen, disinterred, or otherwise mistreated. The concept of property-or better, "quasi property"-indeed may be the most convenient one, but only insofar as it refers to a strictly limited
subset of the "rights, duties, power, liabilities and so on" 24 that
apply to full-fledged property. Neither decedents nor their fami20. See Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182, 1242-45 &
nn.400, 403 & 416 (1974) (discussing The Queen v. Scott, 114 Eng. Rep. 97 (Q.B. 1842);
The King v. Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (K.B. 1788); Dust to Dust, 9 SoL. J. 3 (1864)).
21. 10 R.I. 227 (1872).
22. Id. at 237-38.
23. Id. at 242-43.
24. Matthews, Whose Body? People As Property, 36 CURRENT LEGAL PRoBs. 193, 194
(1983).
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lies have any right to benefit commercially from the sale of bodies. Yet, they have a clear right to seek compensation for emotional distress resulting from mistreatment of a body. Together,
these observations suggest that it is the symbolic human meaning of the body, rather than any commercial interest, that leads
us even to use the fiction of "property" in order to assure that
legal remedies are available for offenses against the body, an object of rich moral significance. 211 The recent laws banning organ
sales also attest to strong and widely-held moral convictions
about the importance of the body. 26
The relationship of the material body to whatever it is that is
morally important about us-whether soul, capacity for reason,
personhood, or something else-has long been a subject of concern and speculation. Although some writers and traditions have
viewed the body as inseparable from that which possesses moral
significance, other thinkers and traditions take an attitude of indifference or even antagonism towards the body. To those dissenting views we now turn.

B.

The Body As Impediment or As Object Without
Significance

The human body, with its appetites and propensities for malfunctioning, has always been problematic for those who quested
after purity, whether of reason or conduct.
For Plato, as for others who preceded him, the body was a
tomb in which the soul was forced to dwell temporarily. In the
Phaedo, Plato argued that the soul's aim is to rid itself of the
body, which stands in the way of true knowledge of the ideal
"Forms." 27 The body, for him, was an impediment.
25. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser
writes:
In most of these cases [dealing with dead bodies] the courts have talked of a
somewhat dubious "property right" to the body, usually in the next of kin,
which did not exist while the decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be
used only for the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but
is a source of liability for funeral expenses. It seems reasonably obvious that
such "property" is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and
that in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a
fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.
Id. (citations omitted).
26. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
27. PLATO, PHAEDO (R. Hackforth trans. 1955); see also Long, Psychological Ideas in
Antiquity, in 4 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 3 (P. Wiener ed. 1973).
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Religious questers as well often have held harsh attitudes towards the body. For Gnostics-searchers after gnosis or true
knowledge-the body was a barrier to their quest, to be surmounted either by self-denial or by licentious attentiveness to
bodily desires. 28 Both extremes share the same fundamental attitudes that the corporeal body is not to be trusted and has no
moral worth. In the third century A.D., the Manicheans practiced severe forms of asceticism in order to free the "particles of
light" that Satan had stolen and imprisoned in man's brain. 29
The Cathari, or Albigensians, who lived between the eleventh
and thirteenth centuries, believed that all matter was evil, forbade marriage, and prescribed for the holiest among themselves
endura, suicide by starvation. so
In Rene Descartes' philosophy, the split between body and
soul widened. Although Descartes was motivated by a desire to
prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, his
efforts to show that material things and things of the spirit are
fundamentally distinct were more successful than his attempts
to wring theological proofs out of that split. Refusing to believe
anything of which he could be less than absolutely certain, he
rejected as illusionary all but one proposition: that there had to
be an "I" who did the skeptical thinking. Thus came his famous
first principle, "I think, therefore I am." From this beginning, it
was but a short distance to the most fundamental split between
that which thinks, res cogitans, and the material world, res
extensa. 31
The propensity to dismiss the body as morally insignificant or,
worse, as a positive barrier to fulfilling humankind's purpose,
has a long history in religious and philosophical traditions. What
attitude we should take towards the body is a question with
which every culture must grapple. There are available only variants of a few possible choices, one of the most common being to
reject the body's moral significance either through promiscuous
28. Petrement, Dualism in Philosophy and Religion, in 2 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY
OF IDEAS, supra note 27, at 42.
29. THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 848-49 (F. Cross ed. 1957).
30. Id. at 30.
31.

I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists entirely
in thinking, and which, for its existence, has no need of place, and is not dependent on any material thing; so that this I, that is to say, the soul, by which I am
what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and is indeed more easy to know
than the body, and would not itself cease to be all that it is, even should the
body cease to exist.
R. Descartes, Discourse on Method, pt. 4, in DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 141
(N. Smith trans. 1952).
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gratification or self-mortification. It is not surprising, then, that
echoes of earlier choices may be heard in contemporary ideas
about the body.
Because much of the intellectual energy in the current debate
over the body as property has come from scholars in the looselydefined field of bioethics (which includes law, religion, and philosophy among other disciplines), it is appropriate to trace out
the ideas of representative thinkers. Two important writers who
reject the morB:I significance of the body are Joseph Fletcher, a
theologian, and H. Tristram Engelhardt, a philosopher.
1. Reason, personhood, and the celebration of control: Joseph Fletcher's moral theology- The theologian Joseph
Fletcher wants to give biology its due, but not assign much, if
any, moral significance to it. To Fletcher, the body is merely a
necessary condition for the pursuit of the truly important possibilities in being human. Its significance is only instrumental,
not essential. 32
To Fletcher, mere bodily life is not particularly important to
human worth or personhood. For this reason, Fletcher is not
morally opposed to euthanasia. "To prolong life uselessly, while
the personal qualities of freedom, knowledge, self-possession and
control, and responsibility are sacrificed is to attack the moral
status of a person."33 When the "person" suffers as a result of
physical pain, the body becomes an impediment to the pursuit
of important moral goods.
A recurrent theme in Fletcher's work is a preference for
human control over natural processes, for design and choice over
chance, for reason over those things indifferent to reason. Discussing contraception, he asserts "the moral stature of men,
their truly human status, is measured by their knowledge of
their circumstances, including physical nature, and by their ability to control those circumstances toward chosen rather than fatally determined ends." 34 His consideration of artificial insemination begins with "the pivot principle of ethics, that man's
moral nature, his quality as a moral being, depends first upon
32. Typical of Fletcher is his attack on Roman Catholic teaching on contraception.
He dismisses it as a throwback "to that counter-Reformation version of the Natural Law
as something physiologically determined, which we have previously described as a denial
of true morality, and as a submission to fatality and to physical (material) determinism." J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 159 (1960).
33. Id. at 191.
34. Id. at 93.
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his possession of freedom of choice and, second, upon his knowledge of the courses of action open to his choice. " 311
Fletcher's equation of artifice and control with moral stature
advocates the "least natural course" as the most morally elevated one, that the artificiality of certain means of conception
makes them, for that reason, preferable to natural means.
Fletcher is even more explicit about this when he declares, "To
be a person, to have moral being, is to have the capacity for intelligent causal action. It means to be free of physiology!" 38 Further, "it is precisely persons-and not souls or bodies or glands
or human biology-that count with God and come first in
ethics. " 37
Fletcher's article about "indicators of personhood" reinforces
the relative unimportance of the body to moral personhood. 38 He
names fifteen positive and five negative criteria. Fourteen of the
fifteen positive criteria are descriptions of various capacities-e.g., self-awareness, curiosity, concern for others. Only one
directly addresses the body-a functioning neocortex. It is clear
from the context that the neocortex is important only because it
is the physiological substratum-the enabling condition-of the
other fourteen criteria.
Of the five negative criteria-those things that he asserts are
not central to moral personhood-three may be taken to pertain
to the human body: that persons are not "non- or anti-artificial";
that they are not "essentially sexual"; and that they are not "essentially parental."39
A later article, reflecting further on "Indicators for
Humanhood," accentuates Fletcher's desire to move the body
outside of our moral compass. He now notes that "neocortical
function is the key to humanness, the essential trait, the human
sine qua non. . . . Only this trait or capability is necessary to
all of the other traits which go into the fullness of humanness. . . . As Robert Williams . . . puts it, 'Without mentation
the body is of no significant use.' " 40
The split between the morally significant "stuff''- reason-and the morally insignificant body could hardly be more
Id. at 100.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man,
CENTER REP .• Nov. 1972, at 1-4.
39. Id. at 3-4.
40. Fletcher, Four Indicators of Humanhood-The Enquiry Matures,
CENTER REP., Dec. 1974, at 4, 6.
35.
36.
37.
38.

HASTINGS

HASTINGS
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radical. Fletcher's desire to control and master the body shares
much with Plato and the Manicheans, though without the latter's leaning towards self-mortification. Fletcher would have us
conquer the body with the aid of technology rather than tame it
with our will.
Given Fletcher's views about the moral insignificance of the
body and his celebration of control and artifice, he could not
have any objection to the commercialization of the body or its
parts based on any intrinsic dignity the body might possess. He
could have other objections, but they would have to be on quite
different grounds. His view of the body and its relation to the
moral person could not support any strong objection to using it
for commercial gain.
2. H. Tristram Engelhardt and the incidental, commercializable body- Engelhardt's secular view of the body has much in
common with Fletcher, the theologian. Society has no interest,
he says, in preserving "mere biological life." In contrast to the
brain, and particularly the neocortex, the body is "a complex,
integrated mechanism that sustains the life of the brain, which
sponsors the life of a person. " 41
The body is more incidental than essential, except in a morally unimportant causal sense. Engelhardt acknowledges that
"[p]ersons, if they are not free of spatiotemporal extension (e.g.,
angels or gods), will be subject to the difficulty of integrating
various experiences as their own," for example, sleeping and
wakefulness. 42 Engelhardt has no difficulty counting the computer HAL in the movie 2001 as a person. 43 Consistent with this
are his views on personhood and brain transplants (personhood
goes with consciousness, with the brain and not the body)"" and
on the proper definition of death, agreeing with Fletcher that in
humans the "person" does not survive the destruction of the
neocortex. 45
From all this, it is clear that for Engelhardt the body is morally important only in an incidental and derivative way. If
mental life could exist without a body (as in HAL or angels, or
the res cogitans of Descartes), or should the body no longer support mental life, then the body itself retains no moral significance. "Talking about persons as spatiotemporally extended entities will therefore mean regarding their intact embodiment as
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

H. ENGELHARDT, supra note 6, at 206.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 215.
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them, as long as that embodiment maintains the full capacities
that are the physical substrata of moral agents."" 6 We may need
our bodies in order to be functioning moral persons, but only in
the same sense that we need food or water. The "person" could
not long exist without them, but they have no moral importance
in themselves.
This does not give us leeway to do whatever we please to the
bodies of other "persons in the strict sense," as Engelhardt labels rational, fully-functioning adults. "One cannot respect other
moral agents, while willing to destroy their unique place in the
world, their embodiment."47 Respect for persons, then, does provide a minimal protection against physical violence to the bodies
of "persons in the strict sense." But that protection does not
extend to less-than-full persons-the severely retarded, the senile, infants, and fetuses-nor does it endow the body with any
moral significance of its own.
Engelhardt has explicit views on commercialization of the
body. His views contrast sharply with thinkers such as Ramsey
and Kass, for whom the special dignity of the body places it
outside the realm of "property," of those things that may be
bought and sold. Engelhardt cites Hegel and Locke to support
his claim that the human body is the quintessential example of
property, of that which we have a right to trade commercially.4 8
But Engelhardt does not stop here. He extends the idea of
embodiment to encompass those things which we own: "Embodiment in this world does not stop at the edges of one's body, but
is extended into other objects marked by one's will. . . . Once
such a right is acquired, it may then be freely sold or otherwise
transferred to others, just as persons may transfer rights over
themselves. "" 9 Engelhardt thus squarely equates the body with
other property we might hold. He makes clear his belief that, if
anything, our right to trade other material objects is inferior to
and less clear than our right to trade our bodies. This right
would permit indentured servitude, if not outright slavery.
For Engelhardt, everything hangs on consent: "Persons own
themselves and own other persons insofar as they have agreed to
46. Id. at 122.
47. Id. at 123.
48. Of Hegel he writes, "[h]is paradigm example of possession is our possession of
ourselves." Id. at 128. He quotes Locke: "Every man has a property in his own person:
this nobody has any right to but himself." Id. He declares "[o]ne's body, one's talents,
and one's abilities are similarly primordially one's own." Id.
49. Id. at 130-31.
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be owned." 110 He explicitly denies the authority of governments
to forbid commercial trade in bodies and their parts: "The authority of governments is suspect, insofar as they . . . [r ]estrict
the choice of free individuals without their consent (e.g., attempts to forbid the sale of human organs)." 111 Should the state
try to prevent such transactions, he defends a "fundamental
moral right to participate in the black market." 112 We own our
bodies and may commercialize them as we wish, according to
Engelhardt. There exists no state authority for interfering in
that commercialization, and there is a moral right to defy any
such efforts at state control.
Against the view that the body is unconnected with whatever
gives moral significance to persons are an array of philosophical
and religious traditions that affirm the moral importance of the
body.

C.

The Person Has/ls A Body

Aristotle, Plato's student, held that the body is intimately and
perhaps unseverably connected to the soul, the source of moral
significance. For Aristotle, body and soul were two aspects of a
single entity: "a body which possesses life." 113
The Hebraic understanding of the body is much closer to Aristotle than to Plato. There is no strict correspondence between
the Hebrew word for "body," basar, and the Greek words for
"body," soma, and "flesh," sarc. The mismatch is so great that
eleven different Hebrew words in the Septuagint are translated
into soma, while basar is more often translated as sarc than
soma. H The Greek idea of humankind as "an angel in a slot machine"1111 contrasts with the "Hebrew idea of personality" as "an
animated body, and not an incarnated soul." 116
According to one commentator, Saint Paul subscribed to the
Hebrew conception of the body even as he used the Greek language to express this conception. The person has different aspects, but it is always one and the same person. The fleshly body
50. Id. at 134.
51. Id. at 144.
52. Id. at 135.
53. Long, supra note 27, at 4.
54. J. ROBINSON, THE BODY: A STUDY IN PAULINE THEOLOGY 11-12 (Studies in Biblical
Theology No. 5, 1952).
55. Id. at 14.
56. Robinson, Hebrew Psychology, in THE PEOPLE AND THE BooK 362 (A. Peake ed.
1925).

SUMMER

1987]

Human Body as Property

1069

is intimately bound up with the source of moral importance, the
soul.67

Hellenic philosophy, as well as Judaism and Christianity, embrace a tradition that refuses to separate radically the body from
the "person." The works of two modern writers, the first a theologian, the second, secular, explore how this tradition deals with
contemporary debates over the commercial exploitation of the
body.
1. Ensouled body, embodied soul: personhood and the body
in the moral theology of Paul Ramsey- "Just as man is a sacredness ·in the social and political order, so he is a sacredness
in the natural, biological order. He is a sacredness in bodily life.
He is an embodied soul or ensouled body." 118 So argues Paul
Ramsey in the preface to The Patient As Person. For Ramsey, a
Christian theologian, respect for the human body as an inseparable part of the person is an important moral duty grounded in
the respect due to all persons created by God.
Ramsey's respect for the body leads to reservations about the
morality of organ donations by living donors. Anticipating the
objection of excessive "physicalism," he responds that we cannot
avoid giving due weight to the physical harm done the donor
because "the only human life we know to respect, protect, and
serve in medical care is irremediably physical, and presented to
us with its moral claims solely within the ambience of a bodily
existenc~. " 69
Ramsey has equally deep qualms about policies that would remove organs from the newly dead without the consent of the
donor while living and the family upon death. Even with consent, he cautions that we cannot "think of our bodies as an ensemble of parts left behind, like old clothes, to be given away or
taken or-worst of all-sold. . . . Proper respect for the body is
irremovably a part of respect for the sanctity of the life of all
flesh." 60 Ramsey is profoundly concerned about humankind's
propensity to regard the body as an instrument, as incidental to
the moral person:
[T]here are many refined and subtle ways by which men
may be encouraged or allowed to treat themselves as
parts only, or collections of parts, in the service of medical progress or societal value to come. In terms of our vi57.
58.
59.
60.

J.

ROBINSON, supra

note 54, at 18.

P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON

Id. at 191.
Id. at 208.

xiii (1970).
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sion of man and his relation to community, there may be
little to choose between the blood and soil, organic view
of the Nazis and the technological, "spare parts," mechanistic analogies of the present day. 61
Ramsey criticizes those Protestant and Catholic theologians
who, he believes, give too little emphasis to the fact of our embodiment. These theologians contribute to the "technological"
view of human bodily existence. Their writings
simply baptize the Cartesian mentalism and dualism of
mind (soul, person) and body that is endemic to the
modern mentality and an epidemic afflicting almost all
contemporary outlooks. Our culture is already prepared
for technocratizing the bodily life into collections of parts
in which consciousness somehow has residence for a
time. . . . The contagious dualism of modern culture has
already placed ... [man], as a spiritual overlord, too far
above his physical life. To most of us a part of the body
or the bodily life as a whole is already only a thing-inthe-world, not to be identified with the person. 62
Ramsey is implacably opposed to commercialization of the
human body, or, at least, its vital organs. This stems from his
view of the body's irrevocable connection to the person, that the
body is a "sacredness" in the biological order. The body's sacred
state requires that it be treated with respect; it also makes the
commercialization of the body morally repugnant.
Ramsey discusses the notion of a kin's "quasi-property right"
to control the disposition of the body for burial in Anglo-American common law. He argues persuasively that this right "was
'quasi' in that possession for commercial purposes was still denied. . . . [The body] was a sort of 'property' in that possession
for a certain human and familial purpose was assigned and legally protected. The latter was the positive human value and interest at stake" 63-not permitting commercial exploitation, not
even at the wish of the person whose body it is, or was.
Should the body become the object of commercial trade, Ramsey paints an ugly portrait:
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 168.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 204.

•
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No longer will survivors "possess" the body for a sacred
trust that possesses them, namely the right and duty to
give decent burial, to which have been added the clear
right and perhaps the duty to give organs of the decedent, as another sort of sacred trust, to prolong the lives
of others. 64
Lest there be any uncertainty about his position, Ramsey warns
against a situation where "the bodies of our fellow men have
been reduced to the property of another, or that the so-called
'consent' to premortem or postmortem organ donation was coerced or tempted by commercial gain. . . . We cannot too
strongly oppose 'the potentially dehumanizing abuses of a market in human flesh.' " 611
Although Ramsey's discussion of cadaver organs does not directly address what to do with other, non vital parts of living
bodies, there is little reason to believe that he would regard
other commercial uses any more favorably. His opposition to
commercialization is grounded in both a belief in the sacredness
of the body as an essential part of the sacred person, and a conviction that sacred things must not be made the object of commerce. So committed is he to the idea of sacredness and bodily
integrity that he proposes, only half-facetiously, that organs
donated by living donors be regarded as merely on "loan," to be
returned to the giver upon the death of the recipient. 66 Ramsey
makes this proposal to emphasize the importance of bodily integrity and the wrong done when integrity is violated, even for
such a great good as preserving the life of another. For him, only
a great preponderance of good could justify harming a live
donor.
Ramsey gives reasons that suggest he would have strong objections to the profanation of the body for commercial gain. His
discussion of living organ donors asks, does the body belong to
the person? His answer: yes. For living or cadaver donors, may
parts of the body be sold? His answer: no.
2. Leon Kass and the "more natural science"- Leon Kass,
a physician and philosopher, calls to task both corporealists, who
view the body as all important, and theorists of personhood,
consciousness, and autonomy, who discount the value of the
body. Kass notes that the corporealist "seeks to capture man for
Id. at
Id. at
TURE 268 (G.
66. Id. at
64.
65.

214.
215 (quoting Ledenberg, Biological Future of Man, in
Wolstenholme ed. 1963)).
195 n.42.

MAN AND

His Fu-
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dumb and mindless nature" while "the latter treats man in isolation, even from his own nature. " 67
In his book, Toward a More Natural Science, 68 Kass attempts
to develop a philosophy of medicine and a medical ethics based
upon what he believes are insights that come from a correct understanding of the body. Both are thoroughly secular, and in
that respect distinct from both Ramsey and Fletcher. But in his
rejection of Cartesian dualism, his suspicion of artifice, and his
embrace of a concept of the body that stresses its dignity, Kass
has much in common with Ramsey and little in common with
Fletcher or Engelhardt. He finds part of his inspiration in the
way physicians regard the body: "Doctors respect the integrity
of the body not only because and if the patient wants or allows
them to. They respect and minister to bodily wholeness because
.they recognize, at least tacitly, what a wonderful and awe-inspiring-not to say sacred-thing the healthy living human body
is."69 Kass echoes Ramsey's sentiments, with a secular overtone,
when he writes of "that mystery of mysteries which is its own
ground: the being of an embodied mind or a thoughtful body."70
On secular rather than theological grounds (though without
eschewing theological language), Kass agrees with Ramsey in tying our embodiment to our moral worthiness:
Our dignity consists not in denying but in thoughtfully
acknowledging and elevating the necessity of our embodiment, rightly regarding it as a gift to be cherished and
respected. Through ceremonious treatment of mortal remains and through respectful attention to our living body
and its inherent worth, we stand rightly when we stand
reverently before the body, both living and dead. 71
Kass finds a suitable example of his theory in the experiences
of medical students upon confronting, for the first time, the cadaver they will be dissecting. Their comments revealed that
"[t]hey understood and felt that they were engaged in something
fundamentally disrespectful-albeit in a good cause."72 But "all
these responses-perfectly natural ones to a layman-are entirely inappropriate and unreasonable . . . on the scientific view
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

L.
L.

Id.
Id.
Id.
72. Id.

supra note 1, at 277.
supra note 1.
at 198.
at 295.
at 294.
at 278.

KASS,
KASS,
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of the body that our medical students are taught and to which
they adhere." 73 Science regards the body as "[e]xtended matter
in necessary and purposeless motion, organized by necessity on
an inherited plan and functioning as pure mechanism."" In life,
the body is "no object for shame, awe, or respect. And in death,
it is a gradually decaying, inoperative, worthless heap of finally
homogeneous ·stuff."711
For Kass, the body has profound significance. "[E]ven the
dead body ... is more than our present science can say."76 The
living body needs to be appreciated as "an organic whole; as
lively and self-moving; as a personal center of awareness, felt
need, and self-concern; as a vehicle of individuated self-presentation and communication. " 77
What is the relationship of the human being to this body: that
of the owner to property? Kass poses a series of questions:
What kind of property is my body? Is it mine or is it me?
Can it be alienated, like my other property, like my car
or even my dog? And on what basis do I claim property
rights in my body? Have I labored to produce it? Less
than did my mother, and yet it is not hers. Do I claim it
on merit? Doubtful: I had it even before I could be said
to be deserving. Do I hold it as a gift-whether or not
there be a giver? How does one possess and use a gift? Is
it mine to dispose of as I wish-especially if I do not
know the answer to these questions? 76
Kass makes clear his skepticism about treating the body as commercial property. Discussing reproductive technologies in general and surrogate motherhood for pay specifically, Kass objects:
"The buying and selling of human flesh and the dehumanized
uses of the human body ought not to be encouraged."79 "Appreciating the meaning of our embodiment, institutionalized already in our taboos on cannibalism and incest, would lead us to
oppose the buying and selling of human organs . . . . " 80 This
position is tied to his general repugnance at the notion of owning "living nature" per se, as his doubts about the wisdom of
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 348.

Journal of Law Reform

1074

[VOL. 20:4

permitting the patenting of life illustrate. He worries about individuals owning entire living kinds, for example, microorganisms.
He sees no natural stopping place between Chakrabarty's bacterium81 and homo sapiens, once we permit the ownership of living
nature. He asks: "If a genetically engineered organism may be
owned because it was genetically engineered, what would we
conclude about a genetically altered or engineered human
being?"82
Kass's adamant refusal to separate the body from what gives
us our dignity (indeed, his premise that we can learn a great deal
about human dignity and moral conduct from looking carefully
at what the body means), coupled with his reluctance to permit
commercializing of the body or treating "living nature" in general as something that should be reduced to mere property, together create a secular argument that strongly links the body to
human dignity. It also raises doubts about the moral acceptability of commercializing the human body.

D.

The Body and Moral Dignity

If we follow the traditions that portray the body as unessential to moral personhood, we cannot find anything intrinsic to
the body that makes it unsuitable for commerce. If, on the other
hand, we follow those traditions that refuse to separate the body
from what is morally important about us, there is a strong prima
facie moral argument against markets in the body and its parts.
We could interpret the common law dealing with dead bodies
and body parts as well as recent state and federal statutes forbidding commercial trade in transplantable organs as evidence
that our culture has opted for the view that the body, at least as
a whole or in its symbolically significant manifestations, has a
moral "dignity" and therefore should not become an object of
commerce. But there is other evidence that we do not view all
trade in body parts with the same seriousness-e.g., hair, nailclippings, plasma, and semen. Even if we resort to the fiction
with plasma and semen that we are trading in a service rather
than a commodity, 83 it is clear that some markets in body products are tolerated. To understand the importance of markets in
81. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
82. L. KASS, supra note 1, at 151.
83. OTA, supra note 17, at 76. Payment for semen and plasma is treated as a sale of
a service rather than a commodity for the purpose of avoiding product liability actions.
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bodies or their parts, we must examine the moral underpinnings-and limitations-of markets.
Ill.

COMMERCIALIZING THE BODY AND THE COMMON GOOD

Aside from their contribution to liberty, the most important
moral argument in favor of markets is that they promote the
common good by permitting each individual to choose that action most likely to maximize his or her own good. In philosophical shorthand, markets are believed to promote beneficence. 8 "
As in the case of arguments based on respect for persons, most
beneficence-based arguments on commercializing the human
body focus on transplantable organs. This introduces some important disanalogies with the most probable uses of human tissues in biotechnology-that, compared to, say, transplantable
kidneys, most such tissues will not need to be taken by intrusive
means, will not pose major risks to the person supplying the tissue, and will not be so dramatically lifesaving to the recipient.
These disanalogies will not affect the arguments in favor of permitting commercialization, but they may weaken some of the arguments against commercialization, particularly those that depend either on the harm done the supplier, or on the lifesaving
nature of the good. Some strong beneficence-based objections
will remain, however.

A. Some Needed Distinctions Among Types of Markets
Anticipating all the kinds of markets in human biological
materials that might arise were commercialization permitted is
an awesome task. The various "goods" that could be traded
might affect our view of the consequences of permitting such a
market. For one thing, body-goods vary in their "cost" to the
supplier. At one extreme, we could imagine a person selling a
vital, nonduplicated organ, such as a liver or heart. At the other
end of the scale are transactions in human materials that do not
impose any significant risks on the supplier, and may be so innocuous that supplying them is no more than an inconvenience.
Human waste anchors this end of the scale, with blood some
small distance up. Bone marrow removal entails pain or the
84. See, e.g., T.
(2d ed. 1983).

BEAUCHAMP

& J.

CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
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need for anesthesia, but the prospect of long-term harm is minimal. Thus, bone marrow probably falls in the middle of the
scale. Kidneys probably sit near the higher end of the scale in
terms of harm (pain, incapacitation during recuperation) and
risk (the chance of the remaining kidney becoming dysfunctional).
Body-goods could also vary in their "value" to recipients, either in the usual sense of monetary value, which markets are
efficient in handling, or in nonmonetary, lifesaving value, which
monetary markets may not produce or distribute in efficient or
acceptable ways.
The distinction between "cost" to supplier and "value" to recipient alerts us to a distinction between the procedures used to
determine how much of a good to produce, which I will call a
production market, and the procedures used to distribute the
good, which I will call an allocation market.
It is quite possible to use a market for production but not for
allocation, or vice versa. For example, we could have a market to
"produce" (acquire) transplantable kidneys, but distribute them
according to some nonmonetary judgments of neediness. Or we
could procure kidneys through some nonmarket system such as
what we now have, but sell them to the highest bidders. I am not
advocating either of these approaches, but it is crucial to understand that beneficence-based objections to markets in organs
can focus on either production or allocation markets, or both.
For example, objections to markets in transplantable kidneys
may emphasize that the wealthy are more likely to receive kidneys (allocation) or that the poor are more likely to sell them
(production).
To escape from some of the peculiar characteristics of the production and allocation of transplantable kidneys, consider a possible market in bone marrow for transplantation. Marrow is
replenishable; although donation is painful and onerous, it does
not carry significant long-term risks. Should bone marrow transplantation become perfected and its efficacy proven, then ft
could become a life-prolonging or even lifesaving good for recipients. In a production market for bone marrow, we could reasonably suppose that the poor would be more willing to undergo the
pain of marrow extraction than would the wealthy, as is the case
with the sale of plasma.
This correlation of wealth with the willingness to sell need not
bother market proponents, because all the usual arguments
about markets allowing each individual to pursue his or her own
good would still apply. As long as sellers participate voluntarily,

SUMMER

Human Body as Property

1987]

1077

market advocates can maintain that they do so because the sellers believe selling their marrow maximizes benefits to
themselves.
B.

Benefits from Commercialization

Advocates of the market argue that allowing rational individuals the freedom to conduct whatever transactions they wish will
promote beneficence. 811 Rational, free individuals will agree only
to those transactions that they believe will maximize their own
good. A society of individuals free to engage in such markets will
maximize beneficence more effectively than a society that restricts this freedom. 86
The argument that beneficence is promoted by permitting
market transactions is a strong one. Even allowing for imperfections, a market in human biologicals could come closer to accomplishing what efficient markets do than would alternative
schemes for determining production and allocation. The market
permits the quantity produced to match the quantity demanded
at an equilibrium price. This price reflects the economic value of
the material to sellers and buyers. Are there any beneficencebased reasons to object to this?
85. For a sophisticated discussion of ethics and markets, see A. BUCHANAN, ETHICS,
EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET (1985).
86. This is, of course, a version of the "invisible hand" theory of Adam Smith. Not all ·
economists believe it in its pure form. Paul Samuelson, for example, suggests that were
Smith alive today, he would reformulate his doctrine to take into account at least four
ways in which markets do not "successfully channel individuals who selfishly seek their
own interest into promoting the 'public interest' . . . . " P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 634
(10th ed. 1976). These amendments include:
(1) the assumption that "abilities and dollar-wealth votes were distributed in 'an ethically optimal manner' -and kept so distributed by nondistorting, nonmarket
interventions";

(2) the admission that "the demands of people in the marketplace sometimes do not
reflect their true well-beings as these would be interpreted by even the most tolerant and
individualistic observers";
(3) that "monopolistic imperfections . . . produce deviations from ideal competitive marginal-cost pricing ... " and are "practically inevitable" in certain situations; and
(4) that external economies and diseconomies sometimes create a "prima facie case" for
intervening in the market.
Id. at 634-35.
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Beneficence-Based Objections to Commercialization

There are two types of beneficence-based objections to commercialization. The first focuses on the assumptions of the market model, such as freedom and rationality; the second grants
the assumptions, but argues that wider, indirect effects of commercialization are preponderantly negative.
1. Assumptions of the market model- Individuals may not
maximize their own well-being through market transactions.
First, the assumption that people are :rational consumers is dubious. Ample evidence exists of irrational human behavior. Although this is not a great problem when the commodity being
traded is a VCR or a cake mix, irrational trade in human biological materials is a more serious matter.
Second, although the assumptions of freedom and rationality
might be warranted for most adults, there are large classes of
people, including children, the mentally ill, and the mentally
disabled, for whom the assumptions are clearly unjustified.
These people might participate in body part production or allocation markets. Given their inability to consent to the use of
their bodies, including invasive procedures necessary to obtain
commercially valuable materials, their participation as sellers
seems morally questionable. Society must decide whether to ban
such people as suppliers, make provisions for their limited participation, or endure the spectacle of unlimited use of the bodies
of such nonconsenting suppliers.
Third, abuse is likely. In every human interaction, including
all market interactions, there is the possibility of abuse-fraud,
misrepresentation, coercion, etc. This is not peculiar to markets
in human materials, but it may be that abuse in this realm is
more morally repugnant than it would be with other goods.
Lastly, there may be a discrepancy between what people desire and what they need;87 that is, between what even rational
and free consumers might pursue in a market, and what those
individuals need to promote their genuine well-being. If it is
morally important to satisfy human needs, and to promote
human flourishing, then the inability of markets to distinguish
between needs and desires is a problem.
Taken together, the assumptions that consumers are always
rational, the existence of frankly nonautonomous participants,
87.

Daniels, Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice, in IN SEARCH or EQUITY:
Rayer, A. Caplan & N. Daniels

HEALTH NEEDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1, 8-9 (R.

eds. 1983).
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the specter of abuses, and the discrepancy between need and desire create doubts about whether body markets will, in fact, enhance beneficence.
2. Wider problems with the market model- The second
type of beneficence-based objections ask about the wider effects
of commercialization, particularly of the human body. They
evoke "externalities," in the economist's lingo, though not externalities that are translatable into money. The "costs" are moral
rather than monetary. Paul Ramsey anticipated this type of objection when he wrote:
Survivors may have gained a lucrative asset in the body.
How lucrative will depend on supply and demand, the
maldistribution or fortunate location of potential donors
and needy recipients, the wealth and social status of recipients, the strength of their will to live, and the cunning of family members when they give telephonic
consent. 88
Implicit in Ramsey's comment is an objection that commercialization of the body will lead to disrespect, devaluation, and
desecration of the human body. This argument is not especially
persuasive to those who believe that the biological body does not
deserve such special respect in the first place-modern Cartesians, such as Fletcher and Engelhardt, or other body market
proponents. 89
A second objection implicit in Ramsey's remarks is that commercialization will somehow threaten our ideals of equality, not
through any explicit declaration in favor of inequality, but because, in a society where wealth is unequally distributed, the
costs of production and benefits of allocation will be unequally
distributed as well. Whether such inequalities come to be seen
as morally unacceptable inequities will depend on a number of
factors having to do with the regnant ideals of the culture, the
history of related decisions, and the nature of the good being
allocated. When inequalities lead de facto to distributions of
production costs and allocation benefits that correlate with
other, morally unacceptable forms of unequal treatment, then
society is likely to find its fundamental values threatened. For
example, when the poor are the suppliers of human biological
materials and the wealthy are the beneficiaries of their alloca88.
89.

P. RAMSEY, supra note 58, at 214.
See supra notes 3, 32-52 and accompanying text.
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tion, the resulting correlation between risks and poverty, wealth
and benefit, would challenge a very important conception of
equality in the United States. 90
Third, some commentators react to Ramsey's assertion that "a
society would be better and more civilized [if man] joined together routinely in making cadaver organs available to prolong
the lives of others [rather than doing it] for the monetary gain of
the 'donor.' " 91 Joel Feinberg, a legal and moral philosopher, for
example, objects strenuously to Ramsey's thesis:
On the one side of the scale is the saving of human lives;
on the other is the right of a person-not simply to grant
or withhold his consent to the uses of his body after his
death . . . -but his power by the use of a symbolic ritual
to convert his consent into genuine "gift." Even in this
extreme confrontation of interest with symbol, Ramsey
gives the symbol more weight. If the subject were not itself so grim I might be tempted to charge him with
sentimentality. 92
Although Feinberg was responding specifically to Ramsey's
opposition to the routine taking of organs, his objection to preferring sentiment over genuine interests would apply with equal
force against the argument in favor of preferring gift transactions over market ones, if the market increased the supply of
transplantable organs. It is true that Ramsey's argument relies
upon an unprovable empirical premise-that moving from gift
to market in human organs carries with it such important losses
to the common good that the losses will, on the whole, outweigh
the benefits. Although Ramsey's premise may not be proven easily, neither is it absurd or easily disproven. 93
A final beneficence-based objection relates to the specific case
of human biological materials donated for research to charitable
90. G. CALABRESI & P. BossrIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 24-25 (1978). William May, a prominent moral theologian, describes a part of what is meant here when, in discussing the
sale of human tissues, he refers to "the tawdriness of a social system that reduces people
to that kind of action." May, Religious Justifications for Donating Body Parts, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1985, at 41. His obvious disgust, which we could assume would
be shared by many individuals, is an "externality" implicit in any commercialization of
human biological materials.
91. P. RAMSEY, supra note 58, at 215.
92. Feinberg, supra note 5, at 32.
93. For a more thorough discussion of what may be lost when markets are substituted for donation systems and when the "commodity" in question is blood, transplantable organs, or tissues, see Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1987, 30-38.
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institutions, for example, university-based biomedical research.
The shift from a gift to a market basis could have damaging consequences in the cost and availability of such materials, public
perception of and generosity towards biomedical researchers,
and increased suspicion of the motives of health providers who
seek to use one's biological materials. 94
Markets can be very efficient means for producing and distributing commodities. But there are ample reasons to worry
whether they are the best means of "producing" or distributing
bodies or body parts. One of the most important considerations
is the impact of commercialization on justice.

D. Justice and the Commercialization of the Human Body
There are distinct questions of justice in both production and
allocation processes. To complicate matters further, there are
many accounts of justice, each of which commands a certain
amount of respect and a set of adherents. Calabresi and Bobbitt,
in their influential book Tragic Choices, 9 r, correctly say that a
society such as ours subscribes to several, incompatible ideals of
justice.96 Indeed, each individual probably holds multiple and
competing notions of justice. Society cannot "read off'' the ethical implications of commercializing human biologicals from a
"correct" theory of justice. It is possible, though, to contrast two
important, opposed views.
Libertarian theorists, on the one hand, emphasize the
processes of exchange, and deny that the unequal distributions
resulting from a series of "fair" exchanges could be unjust. Robert Nozick has provided much of the recent intellectual energy
for this view, 97 and H. Tristram Engelhardt has elaborated the
implications of Nozick's theory for issues such as whether a market in human organs would be just. We will examine Engelhardt's views on justice and the commercialization of the human
body.
On the other hand are theorists, such as Rawls, 98 who believe
that there are constraints on permissible exchanges in addition
to freedom, and who also believe that there may be specific limi94. Murray, Who Owns the Body?: On the Ethics of Using Human Tissue for Commercial Purposes, IRB, Jan./Feb. 1986, at 1, 1-5.
95. G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBI'IT, supra note 90.
96. Id. at 38-40.
97. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
98.

J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE

(1971).
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tations on the institutions a just society may have. Other theorists such as Daniels99 and Vlastos 100 focus on the distribution of
at least some goods-especially those goods necessary to the fulfillment of basic human needs. Vlastos's theory, rather than the
more familiar one of Rawls (or Daniels' elaboration of it for
health care policy), offers a more direct contrast with libertarian
views in its account of what it means to properly respect
persons.
Engelhardt's views on justice and the commercialization of the
body are tied intimately to his notions of respect for persons and
private property. His views rest on the fundamental importance
of autonomy, understood as the free choice of rational persons,
and his idea of property, having as its paradigm case the ownership of one's own body. 101 It should be clear that, given these
premises, interfering with commercial trade in one's own biological materials-including organs-would be perhaps the clearest
and gravest affront to justice imaginable. 102
Engelhardt is unconcerned if this free market results in the
poor selling and the rich buying. Interfering with the free
choices of individuals is a violation of justice. The pattern of distribution is not relevant to justice; indeed, the very notion of
"distributive" justice, of unjust patterns of distribution obtained
from exchanges not in themselves unjust, seems incoherent m
this theory.
This result follows almost unavoidably from the concept of
the person as a radically individual satisfaction-maximizer, and
from the notion that respecting persons means, most of all, not
interfering in transactions to which rational, satisfaction-maximizing individuals agree. The libertarian theory of justice says in
effect that commercial trade in body parts is the essence of justice, and that those who would interfere with it have an exceedingly heavy burden of proof on their shoulders. The more traditional maxims of distributive justice-to each according to need,
99. N. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985).
100. Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 31-72 (R. Brandt ed. 1962).
101. For a discussion of Engelhardt's work, see notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
102.
Since selling oneself freely to another does not involve a violation of the principle of autonomy, such transactions should fall within the protected privacy of
free individuals on the basis of the principle of autonomy. In addition, if one
sells oneself at the right price and under the proper circumstances, one would
suspect that one could maximize one's balance of benefits over harms. But the
point in principle is that free individuals should be able to dispose of themselves
freely.
H. ENGELHARDT, supra note 6, at 366.
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worth, merit, or work-are replaced by to each according to the
agreements he has freely made.
In contrast to libertarians such as Engelhardt, Vlastos defends
an egalitarian theory of justice. His theory has the merit of being
based on a powerful and clear view of respect for persons. In its
emphasis on respect for persons, Vlastos's theory of justice
shares a fundamental presumption with libertarians such as Engelhardt, but reaches very different conclusions.
It is not possible here to lay out the whole of Vlastos's theory
of equalitarian justice, but a few central points can be noted.
First, his theory rests on a concept of natural or human rights,
"which are human not in the trivial sense that those who have
them are men, but in the challenging sense that in order to have
them they need only be men." 103 These human rights are prima
facie claims, to be respected even when not explicitly invoked.
There are also other moral rights-for example, the rights attaching to an elected office-that have similar moral force but
do not stem from the mere fact of one's humanity.
Second, these human rights emerge from a concept of individual moral worth as inalienable and as not admitting of degrees
in the way judgments of excellence or merit must. All humans
are of equal, and everywhere immeasurable, moral worth. Vlastos argues for the propositions that "one man's well-being is as
valuable as any other's" and "one man's freedom is as valuable
as any other's. " 10• From these reasonable propositions, he claims
that "the prima facie equality of men's right to well-being and
to freedom" follows. 1011
Tl\ird, he offers this definition of justice: "An action is just if,
and only if, it is prescribed exclusively by regard for the rights of
all whom it affects substantially." 106 This definition is broad
enough to encompass theorists as far from Vlastos as Engelhardt. Their disagreement will come over what rights must be
considered. Libertarians will elevate freedom, including the freedom to own and transfer property, over all other rights. Equalitarians like Vlastos argue that other rights have equally strong
claims.
Fourth, Vlastos argues that some inequalities can be justified
precisely on the grounds of justice; that is, that the very reasons
for saying that we have equal moral worth and equal rights to
103.
104.
105.
106.

Vlastos, supra note 100, at 91.
Id. at 51 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
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well-being and freedom can also, under certain empirical circumstances, justify limited forms of inequality. He gives the example
of "merit-praise"-praise for excellence. Because all persons
have equal worth, and therefore equal right to the means of
well-being, it would be unjust to refuse a practice like meritpraise when that practice would increase the general availability
of the means to well-being by spurring people onto excellence
and productivity in all spheres. 107
Finally, by showing that certain inequalities may be justified
within an equalitarian theory of justice, Vlastos both establishes
the credibility of such a theory, and shows how society can identify and condemn unjustified inequalities. Society does this by
examining practices to see if the practices deny or diminish the
equal moral worth of individuals or groups of persons, or if they
otherwise enhance or impede satisfaction of the demands of
justice.
Vlastos gives the following example: "Any practice which
tends to so weaken and confuse the personal self esteem of a
group of persons-slavery, serfdom or, in our own time, racial
segregation-may be morally condemned" on the grounds that
"men may be made to feel that they are the human inferiors of
others, that their own happiness or freedom has inferior worth."
This, he says, "would be a grave injustice.mos
To the extent that commercial trade in human biologicals
makes people feel that "they are the human inferiors of others,"
that practice would be unjust. Permitting an allocation market
in lifesaving or life-prolonging human biologicals would probably
have this effect by allowing the wealthy to outbid the poor for
life itself. A production market in the body and its parts could
also have this effect if, as it seems probable, it would lead to the
poor selling more than the rich.
Ironically, we seem to have come full circle. If we are confirmed Cartesians, believing that the body is merely an incidental appurtenance to what is morally significant about persons-their rationality-then those aspects of commercialization
likely to lead to differential participation in the body-market
will not seem offensive, precisely because the body is not particularly connected to our moral worth. If, on the other hand, we
believe respect for persons includes respect for the human body,
107.
108.

Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 71.
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then those empirical properties of the market do pose a grave
threat to justice. 109
Justice, though, is not the only moral category relevant to our
interrelationships. It may be that the fact of our shared embodiment is one of the most significant bonds holding us together in
the face of the powerful centrifugal forces of mass bureaucratic
society.

IV.

COMMUNITY, THE BODY, AND THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS

No society exists solely through market relationships. Not everything should be put up for sale. Even in a thoroughly market
dominated society, justice must not be dispensed to the highest
bidder, lest the very foundations of that society be threatened. 110
The law and economics movement may find a market based
analysis a useful tool, procrustean in its flexibility, but pleas for
universal markets are still rare. Few, if any, advocate selling
children or selling oneself into slavery. Some things, it appears,
should not be left to the vicissitudes of the market. The question
here is: Is the body, or at least some of its parts, unsuitable for
the market?
Proponents of markets in human body parts argue that the
freedom to buy and sell organs and the like is an exercise of
individual liberty that the law ought to endorse, or at least not
prohibit. m They fail to recognize that, as the historian Michael
Ignatieff has said, "We need justice, we need liberty, and we
need as much solidarity as can be reconciled with justice and
liberty." 112 Gifts of the body are one of the most significant
means mass societies have to affirm the solidarity, or community, that humans need in order to mature and to flourish as
individuals. 113
A crucial distinction is that between gift and contract. The
contract is a device constructed to regulate a class of human interactions where the goal is to trade goods or services while minimizing the entanglements of personal relationships. It is difficult to imagine massive market societies conducting their
business without contracts. The mistake made by some champi109. Murray, On the Ethics of Commercializing the Human Body (Apr. 1986) (paper
prepared for the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment).
110. See, e.g., Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. Pue. AFF. 343 (1972).
111. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 48-50, 52 and accompanying text.
112. M. IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 141 (1985).
113. Murray, supra note 93, at 35-37.
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ons of the market is to take the idea of contract, designed as it is
to minimize the relational aspects of human encounters, and use
it as a metaphor for thinking about and governing the full range
of human relationships. 114
In fact, contract is a very poor metaphor for many types of
human relationships. The realm of personal relationships, for
example, is regulated by the "ethics" and the "economics" of
gifts, rather than by contracts. 1111 By gifts, I do not mean the
thin notion in Anglo-American jurisprudence described, for example, in The Oxford English Dictionary as "[t]he transference
of property in a thing by one person to another, voluntarily and
without any valuable consideration." 116 Nor do I mean the apparently onerous conception manifest in Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on gifts: "It is not the office of a man to receive gifts.
How dare you give them? We wish to be self sustained. We do
not quite forgive a giver." 117 Rather, I want to emphasize the
constructive role gift exchanges play as a powerful social practice regulating the initiation and maintenance of personal
relationships.
Anthropologists have studied the central role gifts play in
traditional societies. 118 Although the function of gifts in contemporary industrialized societies may be less obvious, a close study
of gift practices shows that they retain their crucial role in regulating personal relationships, and that we have a highly nuanced
ethic and etiquette of gift-exchange, even if we often are oblivious to its importance. 119
More problematic is the phenomenon of impersonal
gifts-gifts to strangers. We can understand personal gifts in
terms of their value in creating and sustaining personal relationships. The motivation for such personal gifts is a combination of
generosity and self-interest. But what could motivate impersonal
gifts, and what function could they serve? Despite the difficulty
in explaining them, examples of impersonal gifts abound. Americans give extensively to charities of many types, from umbrella
114. Engelhardt appears to make this mistake. H. ENGELHARDT, supra note 6, at 85,
87. See generally id. at 66-103.
115. See supra notes 41-52, 113 and accompanying text.
116. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 156 (1961).
117. R. EMERSON, Gifts, in COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 159, 162
(1979).
118. The locus classicus for anthropological discussions of gifts is M. MAUSS, THE
GIFT (1967). More recent discussions may be found in M. SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS
(1972), and in L. HYDE, THE GIFT (1983).
119. See, e.g., Camenisch, Gift and Gratitude in Ethics, 9 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 1
(1981); L. HYDE, supra note 118.
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organizations such as the United Way, to food banks, churches,
colleges and universities, and many other organizations. Perhaps
most remarkable among the impersonal gifts is the gift of blood.
Approximately eight million Americans donate one or more
units of blood every year. 120 In 1971, Titmuss published a controversial study comparing the blood procurement system in
England and the United States. 121 At that time, much of the
United States' blood supply came through "blood insurance"
programs in which donors were promised that blood would be
available to them and their families if needed; in addition, some
came through paid donors, and some from volunteers. England,
by contrast, relied exclusively on volunteer donors. Titmuss
claimed that not only was the British system morally superior,
but it yielded blood of better quality. A decade later Drake and
colleagues published a defense of the United States' blood procurement system, calling into question a number of Titmuss's
claims. 122 More important for this analysis, though, are the conclusions Drake reached with respect to the motivation of blood
donors in the United States. In the 1970's, the United States
went from a blood procurement system premised on self-interest
to one based on individuals' willingness to give. By 1982, only
three to four percent of whole blood was obtained from paid donors and that percentage was declining. 123 Where local efforts
were well organized, volunteers met the need for blood. 12"
Drake found that Americans were strongly opposed to using
paid donors, and overwhelmingly preferred to use volunteers. 1 H
When asked why they gave blood, American donors cited a general awareness of the continuing need. 126 Drake concludes that
"participation in the whole-blood supply is the natural, unforced
response of a great many people once they are exposed to a mild
degree of personal solicitation and some convenient donation
opportunities. " 127
The intellectual problem is to explain why Americans, committed as they are to individual liberty, reject a market for
whole blood and instead participate in massive numbers in a
system of gifts. As a step towards such an explanation, we might
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

& H.

A.

DRAKE, S. FINKELSTEIN

R.

TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP

A. DRAKE, S. FINKELSTEIN
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 107-11.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 99.

SAPOLSKY, THE AMERICAN BLOOD SUPPLY 4

(1971).
& H. SAPOLSKY, supra note 120, at 3-4.

(1982).
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remember lgnatieff's claim that we need solidarity-community-along with liberty and justice. Perhaps we do
feel "connected" in some way to the strangers in whose midst we
conduct the daily round of life. One of the most powerful and
certain sources of the connectedness is our shared embodiment,
and the experience of illness and bodily neediness common to
all.
There are certain needs, having to do with health, that can be
met only by one person sharing his or her body with another.
Although this could be accomplished through markets, we have
a strong, intelligible, and, I believe, defensible preference for
meeting those needs through gifts: gifts of tissue such as blood
or bone marrow; gifts of organs such as kidneys (from living or
cadaver donors), livers, hearts, or lungs. We affirm our solidarity
when we give of ourselves-literally-to fellows in need. We give
out of generosity and because we need community; we need to
affirm our connectedness in the face of the many forces in mass
society that drive us apart.
CONCLUSION

The body, in its lifesaving and health-affirming manifestations, ought to remain "quasi property" in the eyes of the law. It
should not be treated as ordinary commodity-property like
VCR's or designer jeans.
The body, in its significant manifestations, is not suitable for
markets because our most important religious and secular traditions treat it as "dignity-property" or "sacra," as an integral
part of the person who is the locus of moral concern and moral
worth. It should not be traded in markets because markets in
body parts, like all markets, will be subject to inequities and
abuses. But these inequities and abuses will have special significance in body markets, because it is the morally significant body
(and health, and life) that is being traded off, and because
wealth-sensitive markets in which the wealthy purchase life and
health from the poor will be especially repugnant to our ideal of
justice, which tolerates some, but by no means all inequalities.
Lastly, we should reject body markets because our need to affirm
community requires a realm of gifts by which we may minister
to one another's needs. Gifts of the body, powerfully symbolic of
our shared embodiment, are especially important.

